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Critical Response
II
Automatism
Charles Palermo
We believe that some of the key challenges for the philosophy of photography
remain: i) giving a satisfactory account of the automatism or mechanicity that is
widely taken to be the distinctive basis of photography; ii) clarifying the relation
between causation and intentionality in photography; and iii) explaining the realism
of photographic images—their relation to what they are of—in a way that leaves
room for fictional depiction.1
As Diarmuid Costello and Dawn M. Phillips explain, the relation of
photography’s “automatism or mechanicity” is routinely seen as reason
for viewing photography as “mind-independent, agent-less, natural,
causal, physical, unmediated” (“ACR,” p. 2). So challenge i is really also a
big part of challenge ii. Further, on the accounts of photography’s realism
they consider the most advanced, the independence of photography (its
special modes of detection and depiction) from the mind (beliefs, knowl-
edge, intention) of its practitioner turns out to be especially important, so
challenge i turns out to be important to challenge iii, too.
In what follows, I have little or nothing to contribute to an ontology of
photography—not directly, at least. What I want to discuss is automatism.
The first thing I would like to point out about automatism, in fact, is that
it is not specially photographic. So, while improving our understanding of
automatism seems likely to contribute to all three of these challenges fac-
ing the philosophy of photography, it need not and probably should not
come out of the philosophy of photography.
1. Diarmuid Costello and Dawn M. Phillips, “Automatism, Causality and Realism:
Foundational Problems in the Philosophy of Photography,” Philosophy Compass 4 (Jan. 2009):
15; hereafter abbrivated “ACR.”
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I say a discussion of automatism probably should not come out of the
philosophy of photography because, as Costello and Phillips point out, in
discussions of photography “the term ‘automatic’ stands proxy for a vari-
ety of notions used to characterize the photographic process,” including
“mechanical” and those I already cited: “mind-independent, agent-less,
natural, causal, physical, unmediated” (“ACR,” p. 2). Dominick McIver
Lopes condenses the variety of these impulses in thinking about photog-
raphy and automaticity into a “material conditional”: “if what specifies
photography as an art medium is its automaticity, then taking advantage of
that automaticity curbs authorial agency.”2
Later, in their summation, Costello and Phillips reiterate and expand on
this understanding of the “automatic”: “The intuition that the photo-
graphic process is in some sense automatic is supposed to imply that the
process takes place independently of human agency. It is possible for a
photograph to be produced “automatically”—if, say, a curtain blown by
the wind knocks a Polaroid camera onto the floor and trips the shutter”
(“ACR,” p. 15). There are plenty of reasons to be dissatisfied with this
parable of the automatic. Costello and Phillips, for their part, think “treat-
ing ‘automatism’ and ‘agency’ in general as a zero-sum opposition is in-
coherent” so we want to say a washing-machine exemplifies an “automatic
process,” while we don’t like to say the same of erosion caused by waves on
a coastline. That is because “examples of processes that are entirely inde-
pendent of human agency cannot properly be called ‘automatic’” (“ACR,”
p. 15). To paraphrase a little: automatic processes are not only not unin-
2. Dominick McIver Lopes, “Afterword: Photography and the ‘Picturesque Agent,’” Critical
Inquiry 38 (Summer 2012): 856; hereafter abbreviated “A.” Lopes sees this (flawed) proposition
controlling much writing on photography and agency, including the work in the Critical
Inquiry special issue it was his task to wrap up:
Expressing the triadic relation between photography, automaticity, and agency in the form
of the material conditional permits the reasoning to run in two directions. It may run, as it
does for [Susan] Laxton, from the medium specificity of photography to a tension between
automaticity and agency. Alternatively, it may run from a relaxation of that tension to
doubts about medium specificity. Carol Armstrong begins with the thought that the auto-
maticity of photography has no more momentous implications for authorial agency than
the automaticity of the paintbrush has for painting. Accordingly, she downplays the role of
automaticity in securing the specificity of the photographic medium. Either way the reason-
ing runs, the material conditional operates as a silent partner. [“A,” p. 857]
CHARLES PALERMO is the Alumni Memorial Term Distinguished Associate
Professor of art and art history at the College of William and Mary. He is the
author of Fixed Ecstasy: Joan Miro´ in the 1920s (2008). His email is
cjpale@wm.edu
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tentional but they stand in a certain kind of relation to intentions. The
Polaroid produced by the billowing drapery isn’t taken automatically at
all. Nor would a vase shoved off the sill by the same action shatter “auto-
matically.” Lopes, once again, gets this right: “automatism is not typically
in tension with agency,” he explains.“Tools are fitted to the kinetic, prag-
matic, cognitive, and social capacities of agents in order to extend those
capacities” (“A,” p. 857). He points to Patrick Maynard arguing to similar
effect: “Machines were introduced not only to save labor but also to leave
less to chance.”3 Nevertheless, Maynard notes that mechanicity (in the
form, say, of Aristotle’s auto´maton) has also long been associated with
chance. Thus, he speaks of “automatism’s pincer action”: “On one side,
relevant aspects of the image may be there by chance, while on the
other . . . by natural powers” (“AAA,” p. 731). This may lead to problems,
however, for those interested in “locating the relevant intentions and
thereby the mental content in the space between these contraries” (“AAA,”
p. 732). Again, the automaticity of the photographic image is at odds with
intention, agency, “mental content.” The problem, here as elsewhere—
and this will be my general complaint—is that automaticity is carefully
distinguished from mere mechanicity or chance and then collapsed back
into them. As is surely clear by now, I am skeptical about this picture of
automaticity, to name just one of my objections.
What does offer a good picture of automaticity? If I have a camera that
focuses automatically, then, when I press the shutter release, it automati-
cally focuses. That means, it focuses when I press the button. It does not
focus accidentally; I expect it to focus, I want it to focus, I intend to take a
well-focused picture by availing myself of this feature of my autofocus
camera. (Of course, there are good reasons to turn the autofocus feature
off: you want to focus on a face in the background, not one in the front
row. Yet sometimes autofocus is just exactly what you want.) An automatic
operation is not an accidental one; it is an intentional operation. But if
someone were to ask me what I was doing when I depressed the shutter
release, I would say “taking a picture,” not “focusing.” The gist of automa-
ticity in this context is nicely captured by contrasting intended actions with
descriptions. We call an action automatic if we acknowledge it as our act
(as opposed, say, to an unintended consequence) but want to distinguish it
from the description under which we perform that action.4
3. Patrick Maynard, “Arts, Agents, Artifacts: Photography’s Automatisms,” Critical Inquiry
38 (Summer 2012): 731; hereafter abbreviated “AAA.”
4. Obviously, I borrow the formula “under a description” from G. E. M. Anscombe. When
I speak of an intentional act in the series initiated by the agent as being disconnected from the
action’s description, what I have in mind might be glimpsed in her discussion of intentional
Critical Inquiry / Autumn 2014 169
This content downloaded from 128.239.120.254 on Mon, 30 Jul 2018 20:13:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
There is a further distinction to be made: between automaticity and
automatism. The term automatism goes at least as far back as the eigh-
teenth century. In less current, philosophical senses, it can refer either to
an account of agency on which we merely turn stimuli into actions or,
contrarily, to the faculty by which organisms can originate actions without
external stimulus.5 In more common current use, the term designates ei-
ther a general notion of acting “mechanically, or unthinkingly, esp.
through habit or convention” (OED, sense 3) or, as in the case of automatic
writing, either because the subject cannot (OED, sense 4a) or will not
(OED, sense 4b) control his or her action consciously. This last sense—of
automatism as the ability to act, to write, to make pictures, even, beyond
the control of the conscious mind—is the sense most pertinent to the
present discussion. (It might easily go without saying that “mechanically”
in the OED’s third sense is strictly metaphorical and requires—even per-
mits—no machinery to play the pivotal part in rendering the action auto-
matic.) This is why surrealism comes up in connection with photographic
automatism and its relation to art. Of course, surrealist discussions of
automatism have their roots in the slightly older medical and spiritualist
senses of automatism (that is, OED, sense 4a).
First of all, before we proceed further, let’s note that the discourse of
automatism locates the disjunction—the division between the action and
the description that we found to be constitutive of the automatic—in the
agent, not in a machine or even in a process, such as photography. Plan-
chette writing is a form of automatism not because planchettes are ma-
chines but because the spirit medium is divided (dissociated) and cannot
describe him- or herself as writing, even if he or she can acknowledge that
he or she is doing the writing:
Miss S. . . ., of whom I have already spoken, sensed the movements of
the planchette beneath her fingers and, by much practice, came to
anticipate her automatic writing before reading it. She would say to
me, without looking at the planchette: “Ah, that’s Johnson who wrote
that,” and in fact the Spirit would have signed “Johnson.”6
Whether you take “the Spirit” to be the conscious spirit of a dead person
named Johnson (as the spiritualist might) or a persona or personality
acts within series that are not “swallowed up” by the series’ description (G. E. M. Anscombe,
Intention [Oxford, 1963], §26, p. 47).
5. Here I refer to the Oxford English Dictionary’s first two senses of automatism.
6. Pierre Janet, L’Automatisme psychologique (1889; Paris, 1989), p. 471; my trans.
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created by some dissociative phenomenon, such as hypnosis (as a skeptical
researcher might), the automatism lies in Miss S.’s dual relation to her own
writing activity. It has nothing to do with the mechanism or even with
spontaneity, as is generally believed of automatism. In fact, “the medium,”
Janet goes on to point out, “anticipating thus the writing of his spirit,
sometimes consciously completes it and collaborates with him in his sin-
gular compositions.”7 It is the medium’s and the researcher’s shared un-
derstanding of the automatic writing—according to which it both is and is
not the medium’s act—that makes it automatic. Generally, I think we want
to speak of an automatic act as automatic if we are tempted to note some
disconnection (or disconnections) between our intentions in performing
it and the description under which we act. Automatism is our way of
describing the capacity (or incapacity) in the agent that produces the dis-
connection between the agent’s intentions and descriptions. Sometimes
that (in)capacity looks like a pathology (say, somnambulism), sometimes
like a special talent or sensitivity (spirit mediumship), but sometimes it
looks like a technique, as in the case of photography or of surrealist psychic
automatism.
When young surrealism addressed the question of a surrealist pictorial
art, the key question was whether such a labored and deliberate activity as,
say, painting, could sustain automatism. Max Morise offered the most
careful and thorough consideration of this problem I know of within the
surrealist camp. His conclusion was precisely that the psychological au-
tomatism Janet discussed was what the movement needed: “A good num-
ber of paintings by madmen or mediums show the strangest appearances
and bear witness to the most imperceptible mental currents. You could put
into an algebraic equation that such a painting is to x what the tale of a
medium is to a surrealist text. Heavens!” For Morise, the trick of autom-
atism lies in “forgetting what has just been done, or better, ignoring it”—just
like a medium, who ignores the fact that she is writing to permit another
self (even if that other self is really her own) to have its say. Is it a coinci-
dence that, in his closing paragraph, almost immediately after disclosing
his answer to surrealist art’s theoretical problem, Morise asks “Who is this
Man Ray, our friend, who is making with sensitized paper things of the
most incredible elegance from the most ordinary things?”8 I doubt it. But
the fact that Morise can see a relation between Man Ray’s use of photo-
7. Ibid.
8. Max Morise, “Enchanted Eyes” (1924), trans. Mary Ann Caws, in Manifesto: A Century of
Isms, trans. Caws et al., ed. Caws (Lincoln, Nebr., 2001), p. 481. For a fuller discussion of
Morise’s text in light of the psychological discourse exemplified by Janet, see my Fixed Ecstasy:
Joan Miro´ in the 1920s (University Park, Pa., 2008), pp. 85–96.
Critical Inquiry / Autumn 2014 171
This content downloaded from 128.239.120.254 on Mon, 30 Jul 2018 20:13:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
graphic processes and automatism does not exactly tell us what that rela-
tion is. All we can see here is that photography is valuable for the privileged
access to automatism it gives someone like Man Ray, and that access ap-
pears to depend on its automaticity (that is, on the ability of “sensitized
paper” to pry apart intentional actions and their descriptions).
This prevalent intuition that photography has some kind of inherent
automaticity (and, thereby, offers privileged access to automatism) merits
some thought. Patrick Maynard, in his The Engine of Visualization, con-
siders a strong and classic argument that photography’s mechanicity is a
fatal flaw—at least for photography as an art.9 The great “naturalistic”
photographer Peter Henry Emerson (from “The Death of Naturalistic
Photography” in 1890 on) claimed that
the artistry around photography . . . consists in a few “limited” ele-
ments of selection—of view, lens, focus, exposure values, and printing
methods—but it is “the machine that draws the photograph,” and
“The result is machine-made; the trapping of a sunbeam”: “The pho-
tographer does not make his picture—a machine does it all for him.”
It follows that whereas art is “personal,” photographs are “machine-
made goods.” Owing to this lack of “individuality” or the “personal,”
which is due to the extremely “mechanical” aspect of photographic
technology, photographs lose interest, where etchings and paintings
do not.10
Maynard catches Emerson drawing a comparison between photography
and true arts precisely in terms of mechanicity:
In photography man puts the machine under certain physical condi-
tions, and the machine will always (in the same conditions) bring
about the same result, therefore the process is logically mechanical.
On the other hand, a personal art is one in which the results would
differ again and again under the same physical conditions, for the
mind would work differently on each so-called ‘replica’ of the
original.11
This quotation helps Maynard argue that Emerson wants photography to
be less regular in its results, that he rebels against its mechanical reliability.
In his recantation, though, Emerson’s complaint against photography is
that, on account of its mechanicity, photography denies the photographer
9. See Maynard, The Engine of Visualization: Thinking through Photography (Ithaca, N.Y.,
1997), esp. 265–75.
10. Quoted in ibid., p. 271.
11. Ibid., p. 272.
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sufficient control, not that photography didn’t offer sufficiently varied
results: “I thought once (Hurter and Driffield have taught me differently)
that true values could be obtained and that values could be altered at will by
development. They cannot; therefore, to talk of getting the values in any
subject whatever as you wish and of getting them true to nature, is to talk
nonsense.”12A couple of years later, Emerson revisited his comparison be-
tween the agency of the photographer and that of the painter. He imagines
a painter and a photographer setting out to picture a stretch of shore: “The
photographer at once sets up his machine, focuses and exposes; but in
these very processes his ideal has gone. What results may be beautiful, but
it is no more the representation of his ideal, the vision he first saw. It is
something else, for the machine imposes certain conditions which were
never in the photographer’s mind at all.”13 Photography’s mechanicity in-
troduces a gap, a discontinuity between the ideal the photographer intends
and wants to capture and the photograph.
Not so for the painter: “each touch helps to his desired or ideal end. . . .
Everything is done unto one end, and all is certain from the first” (NP,
1.185). Emerson calls a painting “a perfect index of its creator’s mind.” Yet
the painter’s “ideal will vary with individuals and in the individual from
day to day, nay, from hour to hour” (NP, 1.182). In other words, the painter
can lose his “ideal,” as the photographer does. (Maybe if this weren’t the
case, failed paintings would be rare.) But the painter’s work is vulnerable to
an opacity within himself—like that of the medium. This raises an inter-
esting problem, though: if realizing one’s “ideal,” one’s plan, means brav-
ing whatever opacity, whatever discontinuity, separates that aspiration
from its realization, then painting is not sure in a way photography isn’t.
Further, when it works, it will, like the automatically focused camera, both
fulfill the agent’s aims and also seem to have come out, to have turned out
right, of itself. Which is to say, it will be “automatic,” like photography. In
the end, machinery is beside the point.14
So, if the automaticity we routinely associate with photography is not
uniquely photographic or even mechanical, how about the automatism so
12. Peter Henry Emerson, The Death of Naturalistic Photography, in “Naturalistic
Photography for Students of the Art” and “The Death of Naturalistic Photography” (1899; New
York, 1973), p. [3].
13. Emerson, Naturalistic Photography for Students of the Art, in“Naturalistic Photography
for Students of the Art” and “The Death of Naturalistic Photography,” 1.185; hereafter abbreviated
NP. According to a footnote, the proposition is a revision of a paper Emerson read before the
Photographic Society of Great Britain in March 1893; see NP, 1.170.
14. For another argument that makes a similar point, but in greater detail, see Walter Benn
Michaels, “Action and Accident: Photography and Writing,” The Gold Standard and the Logic of
Naturalism: American Literature at the Turn of the Century (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 215–44.
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many associate with photography and specifically with its mechanical at-
tenuation of agency? Costello takes on a set of arguments by Rosalind
Krauss about the relation of automatism to photographically dependent
works, such as (for our purposes) the animated short films of William
Kentridge.
Kentridge describes the process by which he makes his short animated
films, such as Mine (1991). Without attempting to capture the process in
full detail, I’ll point to a couple of important features of it. First, Kentridge
uses an unusual procedure: rather than animate his images with a series of
drawings, he photographs a single drawing in a series of slightly trans-
formed states, so that, when the photographic record of the successive
states is screened at cinematic speed, animation results. Second, Kentridge
specifically refers to the generative role of his working process (and even
environment) in the development of his drawings and of his films: “While
sitting around contemplating I either go round in tight circles or slip into
neutral and vegetate. An activity is essential to me. It is only when physi-
cally engaged on a drawing that ideas start to emerge.” Finally, Kentridge
compares this activity—generating motifs in or through the actions of his
work—to ordinary extemporaneous speech: “Generally, and here the pro-
cess I have described and the nature of the speech get closer, there is an
impulse and knowledge of the general direction we want to go in. But then
there is a reliance on habit, experience and unconscious parts of the brain
for a sentence to emerge that is formally connected and gets to the desti-
nation you had anticipated.”15
Their other differences notwithstanding, these three points are key for
both Krauss’s view of Kentridge and Costello’s. The deeper issue between
Krauss and Costello has to do with Krauss’s use of some arguments of
Stanley Cavell’s on the transformations of (or, even, the invention of)
artistic media under modernism. The concept of automatism is part of
Cavell’s account of artistic medium and a prominent feature of Krauss’s
discussion, too. Costello takes her to task for misrepresenting Cavell’s dis-
cussion of both medium and automatism and also for offering (the issue of
her fidelity to Cavell aside) inadequate discussions of both automatism
and medium.
I want to focus on the issue of automatism. It cannot be completely
separated from the matter of medium; nevertheless, I think I can discuss
the relevant points concerning automatism apart from the question of
15. William Kentridge, “Fortuna: Neither Programme nor Chance in the Making of
Images,” Cycnos 11 (June 2008): revel.unice.fr/cycnos/index.html?id1379
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whether a medium can be invented by an artist, which is the fundamental
point of disagreement between Krauss and Costello.
Krauss glosses Kentridge’s description of his working process in Mine,
substantially as I have, including his comparison of his method with ordi-
nary speech, and sums it up:
The analogy he makes is to the way ordinary language, deploying it-
self in the course of conversation, is for the most part guided by habit,
by learned patterns of speech, by rote formulations, by gambits and
cliche´s. Thus, though we embark on our discourse knowing generally
what we want to say, much of our activity of choosing the words and
forming the sentences is preprogrammed, semimechanical, a form of
automatism.
To this, Krauss opposes another sense of automatism that she locates in
Kentridge’s remarks—“a sense that is the very opposite of the first”—
which she compares to “free association” and calls an “upsurge from the
unconscious of the unanticipated, the unexpected.”16 In other words, au-
tomatism (as Krauss understands it to function in Kentridge’s practice)
combines the mechanical, habitual, and deliberate with the irruption of
the unconscious into that deliberate process.
Costello is surprised by Krauss’s use of automatism. “The brute autom-
atism of the camera itself, the fact that cameras are capable of producing an
image of whatever they record without subjective mediation—which
would be the most obvious sense of the automatic for Cavell in this do-
main—does not even figure” in her account (Costello, “Automat, Auto-
matic, Automatism: Rosalind Krauss and Stanley Cavell on Photography
and the Photographically Dependent Arts,” Critical Inquiry 38 [Summer
2012]: 836). I’ve already said why I don’t think it makes sense to speak of
automatism as inhering in or being a feature “of the camera itself.” That is
not how the concept of automatism developed originally or how it was
used when it arrived in art-theoretical parlance. It is a more or less unana-
lyzed innovation of a certain kind of theorizing about photography, and I
do not see much reason to ascribe it to Cavell or, at least, to understand his
remarks about automatism in such terms. (But that is another topic.)
On the other hand, Costello doubts the use to which Krauss does put the
notion of automatism: “Krauss interprets Kentridge’s description of what
is essentially a form of practical know-how as an artist, his intuitive sense
of when to push and when to wait while working on a drawing, in such a
16. Rosalind E. Krauss, “‘The Rock’: William Kentridge’s Drawings for Projection,”
Perpetual Inventory (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), p. 58.
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way that it emerges as a form of psychic automatism. On the resulting
account, it is Kentridge’s unconscious, rather than Kentridge simpliciter,
that is responsible for what appears in the drawing” (p. 838). Of course, as
I’ve tried already to explain, this use of the term automatism is perfectly
orthodox.
Nevertheless, Costello resists it on two grounds. First, he says Krauss’s
account is not an adequate description of automatism for the relevant (by
which I take him to mean artistic) purposes: “it is a form of practical
judgment that has its counterparts, born of hard-won experience, across
almost any domain of human activity one cares to think of. Construing it
as a form of psychic automatism has implausible implications for these
other domains. Is knowing how tightly to tune an engine or when to re-
frain from disciplining a child an automatism in this sense of the term?” (p.
838). I think a reasonable response would be “Why not?”
In his account of habit, William James articulates a continuity of
habitual actions that progresses from walking to fencing and even to
musicianship:
If an act require for its execution a chain, A, B, C, D, F, G, etc., of suc-
cessive nervous events, then in the first performances of the action the
conscious will must choose each of these events from a number of
wrong alternatives that tend to present themselves; but habit soon
brings it about that each event calls up its own appropriate successor
without any alternative offering itself, and without any reference to
the conscious will, until at last the whole chain, A, B, C, D, E, F, G,
rattles itself off just as soon as A occurs, just as if A and the rest of the
chain were fused into a continuous stream.17
So, a “gleam in his adversary’s eye, a momentary pressure from his rapier,
and the fencer finds that he has instantly made the right parry and return.
A glance at the musical hieroglyphics, and the pianist’s fingers have rippled
through a cataract of notes” (PP, 1:114). Habit can be bad, but it is also the
condition of a certain kind of high performance: “The more of the details
of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism,
the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper
work” (PP, 1:122). James strikes me as the right kind of source (historically,
for instance) for reconstructing the relevant meaning of automatism. Fur-
ther, though, I take the phenomena he explains to be more or less exactly
what Krauss and Kentridge are describing.
17. William James, Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (1890; New York, 1950), 1:114; hereafter
abbreviated PP.
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Costello’s other objection is that Krauss’s account “mischaracterises
Kentridge’s artistic agency in setting out to harness, among other things . . . his
own free associations as an automatism” because “remaining open to,
indeed setting things up in such a way as to solicit and encourage, such
promptings is anything but automatic; it is sought out. Construing this as
an automatism would be like construing the activity of a psychoanalyst, as
opposed to the material they work with, as automatic” (p. 839). In this, I
would be inclined to agree with Costello and Phillips against Costello that
“the idea that oppositions such as automatism and agency . . . stand in a
zero sum relation” is more of a hindrance than a help in thinking through
these problems in the philosophy of photography (“ACR,” p. 15). Another
way to put it would be to say that nothing stands as a better example of
“remaining open to, indeed setting things up in such a way as to solicit and
encourage” an automatic outcome than the agency of the photographer.18
If Kentridge’s work fails to count as automatic, and fails precisely because
he does too much to enable its automaticity, then nothing is less capable of
being automatic than photography.
18. One might think here of the work of some photographers who precisely thematize their
preparation—such as Thomas Demand. For an account of his practice and of “to-be-seenness”
in contemporary photography, see Michael Fried, Why Photography Matters as Art as Never
Before (New Haven, Conn., 2008).
Critical Inquiry / Autumn 2014 177
This content downloaded from 128.239.120.254 on Mon, 30 Jul 2018 20:13:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
